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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEWBURGH, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NEWBURGH TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1867, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
//2A-1/12/82 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-5047 
DAVID S. SHAW, ESQ., for Respondent 
KENNETH WILDER, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Newburgh 
Teachers Association, Local 1867, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Local 1867) 
to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge that the 
City School District of the City of Newburgh (District) refused 
1/ to execute a collective bargaining agreement.— Local 1867 s 
charge alleges that, on October 30, 1979, authorized representa-
tives of the District agreed upon terms and conditions of 
employment to succeed a contract that had expired on June 30, 
1979, but that when the memorandum was presented to the District 
in the form of a contract, the District refused to execute the 
document. 
The hearing officer specified two bases for his decision 
1/ The hearing officer issued a consolidated decision in which he 
disposed of Case No'. U-4959, as well as the matter herein. 
There are. no exceptions to that part of his decision- which dealt 
with the issues in U-4959. .Accordingly, those.issues, are.not 
before us. 
Board - U-5047 
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dismissing the charge. The first was that the District was under 
no obligation to execute the alleged contract because it had not 
been ratified by the School Board, the right to such ratification 
having been agreed upon by the parties. The second was that the 
alleged contract submitted by Local 1867 to the District for 
-executiorF did;:not:T_con^ain:"the7prec:£ s-'e" "terms1-;:tlxatT: had been-agreedT ;:: 
upon by the parties. Local 1867 makes two arguments in support 
of its exceptions, both of which are addressed to the first 
basis of the hearing officer's decision. It contends that the 
hearing officer erred in determining that the 'School'Board'had.not 
ratified the agreement and it argues that, in any event, 
ratification of the contract by the School Board was unnecessary. 
We need not reach either of the issues presented by Local 
1867's exceptions. The hearing officer found that the alleged 
contract submitted by Local 1867 to the District clearly gave to 
substitute teachers salary increases that had not been agreed 
upon on October 30, 1979. The record shows this to be the case. 
Indeed, it shows that there were extensive negotiations after 
the agreement of October 30, 1979, and that these further negoti-
ations involved differences between the parties that were not 
resolved. Accordingly, there was no final agreement between the parties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing officer 
that the District was not obligated to 
execute the alleged contract, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
Board - U-5047 
it hereby is, DISMISSED 
DATED: January 11, 1982 
Albany, New York 
%9^*yJ5^EjU^l 
Harold R.Tvewman, Chairman 
A*. ^ 4*4-Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
. //2B-1/12/82 
In t h e M a t t e r of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, 
R e s p o n d e n t , 
- a n d -
HARRY FARKAS, 
Charging Party. 
ARNOLD W. PROSKIN, P.C., for Respondent 
HARRY FARKAS, pro se 
The charge herein was filed by Harry Farkas, an employee of 
the New York State Department of Health (Department) who is in 
the Professional, Scientific and Technical Employees Negotiating 
Unit. It alleges that the Public Employees Federation (PEF) did 
not represent him fairly in connection with a complaint that the 
Department improperly denied him a promotion from his position of 
Associate Radiological Health Engineer, G-27, to Principal 
Radiological Health Engineer, G-31. The hearing officer dismissed 
the charge on the ground that the events it complains about 
occurred more than four months before the date that it was filed. 
The matter now comes to us on Farkas' exceptions. 
FACTS 
Farkas, who was then 67 years old, complained to PEF on 
March 24, 1980 that he had been illegally passed over for 
promotion because of his age and he asked its assistance in 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
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obtaining the promotion. PEF denied Farkas' request on April 1, 
1980, indicating that it had reviewed his complaint with the 
Civil Service Commission and was satisfied that the Department 
of Health had not acted illegally. Farkas then filed an improper 
practice charge against PEF (Case No. U-4779) in which he 
-eompl-ainexi—tha-fc—P^  
constituted a violation of its duty of fair representation. A 
pre-hearing conference was held in this case on August 5, 1980 
at which Farkas withdrew the charge on the condition that PEF 
would advise him of the nature of its investigation of his 
complaint against the Department and would provide him with an 
attorney's analysis of the legality of the Department's action. 
PEF's attorney sent Farkas a legal analysis of the situation 
on October 7, 1980 which reaffirmed PEF's conclusion that the 
Department had committed no legal wrong and informed Farkas that 
PEF would take no further action. This did not satify Farkas. 
Arguing that PEF's attorney's letter did not satisfy the conditions 
for the withdrawal of the charge, he made several requests to 
the hearing officer that the case be reopened. On January 14, 
19.81, the hearing officer wrote Farkas that the case would not be 
reopened because the conditions of the withdrawal had been met. 
The charge herein was filed on April 21, 1981. 
Some changes in the status of the position which Farkas was 
seeking were made during the time between his original complaint 
to PEF and the filing of the instant charge. The most important 
of these was that the position, which had been previously filled 
on a provisional basis, was later filled by a permanent appoint-
i im 
Board - U-5391 
merit. Also, on December 19, 1980, a staff member of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notified the Department 
that an investigation of a complaint by Farkas revealed that the 
Department's failure to promote him constituted a violation of 
the Age Discrimination Act of 1967. Subsequently, on February 2 
1981, the EEOC wrote to Farkas that its attempt to conciliate 
the matter had been unsuccessful and that, having reviewed the 
issues, it had decided to take no further action. Farkas sent 
copies of the letters of EEOC to PEF on March 23, 1981. 
The hearing officer determined that the conduct of PEF in 
the instant charge is the same as that complained of in U-4779. 
Thus, the allegedly improper conduct of PEF occurred on April 1, 
1980, when it first refused to support Farkas' position. In 
accordance with this reasoning, the time to file the charge 
expired on August 1, 1980. Taking an alternative approach to 
the case, the hearing officer reasoned that PEF might have 
committed a further violation on October 7, 1980 when, after 
reconsidering Farkas' complaint pursuant to the agreement 
settling the earlier case, it once again refused to represent 
him. In accordance with this reasoning, the time to file the 
charge expired on February 7, 1981. In either case, according 
to the hearing officer, the filing of the charge on April 21, 
1981 was too late. 
Farkas specifies ten exceptions to the hearing officer's 
decision, but, as the arguments overlap, four positions emerge. 
1-7289 
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He first argues that Case U-4779 should be reopened, his 
withdrawal of the charge herein being a nullity in that the 
conditions for that withdrawal were not met. Without reaching 
the questions whether, or on what conditions, a charge can be 
reinstated once it is withdrawn, we reject his position because 
~it~-was7-n-©--fc-"^ e^s-en-t^  : 
officer in Case U-4779 ruled on January 14, 1981 that the case 
could not be reopened because the conditions that had been 
imposed upon PEF for its withdrawal had been met. That rule 
constituted a final disposition of the matter by the hearing 
officer. It could have been brought to our attention pursuant 
to §204.10 of our Rules which permit exceptions within 15 working 
days of a hearing officer's decision. Not having followed this 
procedure, Farkas cannot now be heard to propose the reinstatement 
of Case U-4779.-/ 
Farkas' second argument is that the charge in the instant 
case is timely because the four-month limitation period set forth 
in our Rules was tolled between October 13, 1980 when he first 
requested the reopening of U-4779 and January 14, 1981 when his 
request was denied. Thus, because the actionable impropriety 
of PEF occurred on October 7, 1980, the charge herein is timely. 
There is no legal basis for Farkas' argument that the time to file 
the charge was tolled because a request was pending in a related 
case. A party is expected to protect its interest by filing a 
-'See Board of Education, New York City (Behrens), 14 PERB 1[3034 
(1981X 
I wo 
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timely charge even while pursuing other avenues of redress.— In 
any event, Farkas had between January 14, 1981 and February 7, 
1981 to file a timely charge after the hearing officer's ruling 
in U-4779. 
The third argument made by Farkas is that changes in the 
-uad^ri-yj^g—si 
charge from the earlier one and make it timely. Farkas1 position 
is that he is entitled to a new consideration by PEF on the merits 
of his complaint that the Department passed him over for promotion 
each time he calls PEF's attention to a new circumstance relating 
to it. Thus, when on March 23, 1981, he informed PEF that the 
EEOC had found merit in his complaint, it should have made a new 
determination as to whether it would support him. Accordingly, 
its refusal to support him after being notified of the EEOC's 
position constituted an independent violation of the duty of fair 
representation and one for which a timely charge was filed on 
April 21, 1981. 
While we can conceive of changes in circumstances of 
sufficient magnitude to require an employee organization to 
reassess its determination to support the complaint of a unit 
employee, not every change compels such a reconsideration. 
Otherwise, there could be no finality to any decision involving 
the complaint of a unit employee because, in the nature of 
things, changes occur with the passage of time. We find nothing 
on the face of the charge herein to distinguish it from the 
- See Board of Education, New York City (Greenberg)_, 12 PERB 
113069 (1979). = " ~ 
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charge in U-4779 except for details that are not significant. 
A letter from a member of the staff of EEOC, stating that the 
Age Discrimination Act of 1967 was violated, is not of such 
magnitude, particularly when the EEOC later declined to take 
=an-y—£ur-ther—act-ion^  
care. 
Farkas' fourth contention is that, in his opinion, the 
hearing officer did not specifically deal with each of the 
arguments that he raised in support of his charge or explain 
all of those arguments.. He complains that this failure 
might indicate that the hearing officer had failed to take 
some of the arguments into account and that, in any event, the 
hearing officer's failure to state his arguments made it appear 
that the arguments did not exist, thus making him appear foolish. 
Having reviewed the record; including., the exceptions /and:.. ••'•' 
arguments, we determine that the hearing officer dealt with all 
the issues of consequence that came before him and that Farkas 
was not prejudiced by the fact that not all of his arguments 
to the hearing officer were addressed in the hearing officer's 
decision. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED 
January 11, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VESTAL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
VESTAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYEA/NEA, 
Charrgingf T a r ty. 
//2C-1/12/82 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4873 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, ESQS. (JOHN B. HOGAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
JACK SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Vestal 
Central School District (District) to a hearing officer's 
decision that it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith 
with the Vestal Teachers Association, NYEA/NEA (Association) in 
that it reduced the salaries of guidance counselors when it 
unilaterally eliminated one of two weeks working time that had 
been customarily worked by the guidance counselors during the 
month of August. The District does not challenge the Association's 
allegation that it laid off its guidance counselors for one week 
in August and the Association does not allege that the District 
refused to negotiate the impact of its action. The sole question 
presented by the charge is, therefore, whether the District's 
conduct was lawful. 
The guidance counselors had worked two weeks each August 
during each of the seven years preceding 1980. Their primary 
duties during this two-week period were to review student course 
Board - U-4873 
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schedules, to check those schedules that were rejected by the 
computer and to resolve scheduling conflicts for individual 
students. By 1980, this assignment no longer required two weeks 
for its performance because declining student population and 
increasingly efficient procedures had diminished the amount of 
^ork-1^at-b^^i^~%e ~pex^ ,-~there;#or eT,- ^oi-d~--"•"-'-~ ------
its guidance counselors in May. 1980, that they would be laid 
off for one week in August 1980, because of a lack of work. 
This information was brought to the attention of the Association's 
nresident on June 24, 1980. 
In a line of cases beginning with City of New Rochelle, 
4 PERB 1(3060 (1971) and most recently in Schuylerville CSD, 
14 PERB 1f3035 (1981), this Board has held that: 
"a public employer may, for good business reasons, 
reduce the services that it provides to the public. 
Such a good faith reduction iri; services may justify 
the public employer in reducing its employees' work-
load with a commensurate reduction in salaries." 
Schuylerville CSD, supra, at p. 3058. 
These decisions parallel a line of decisions of the National 
Labor Relations Board which hold that layoffs necessitated by 
curtailment of production for business reasons are lawful. 
As noted by the hearing officer, the instant situation could 
be distinguished from the one covered by the above-cited line of 
cases of this Board. Here the guidance counselors were not laid 
off because the District chose to reduce the services that it 
provides to the public, but because less work was required to 
provide the same services that had been previously provided. 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, this distinction may be 
jL. 7875 
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of no consequence. A layoff because of lack of work has not been f 
held to be unlawful. ' Tidewater Iron & Steel' Co. , 9 NLE.B 624 j 
(1938). However, the hearing officer determined that this princi-
ple is not applicable under the Taylor Law by virtue of our 
decision in' State of New York (SGKYA) , 13 .PERB i[3044 (1980) . 
, 
-
:
-
:
 "^^The^re^sOTiihrg^ o~f State 'rof:~^e^'':^6^'''~tsxx^t~^^=sg-pr&^^r to the- j 
facts in the instant situation. In that case the State directed [ 
the absence of some nonprofessional employees on the day following* 
I 
Thanksgiving Day on the basis that classes were not in session on j 
1
 1 
that day and that heating costs could.thereby be saved. In the 
past, they did, however, .work on that day following Thanksgiving, 
even though classes were not in session. Accordingly, there was 
no indication in that record that lack of work on that day for 
the affected employees justified the layoff of those employees. 
On those facts, we said that the State could direct the employees j 
not to come to work, but only so. long as the directed absences 
were without loss of employees' salaries or benefits.— 
In the case before us, the evidence establishes a signifi-
cant diminution of the amount of work available to be performed 
by the guidance counselors. Accordingly, we reach the conclusion f 
of fact that they were laid off for one week in August because of 
i 
a lack of work for them. f 1/ For reasons that are not here relevant, no violation was 
~~ found in that case. 
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This conclusion presents the question whether under the Taylor 
Law, like under the NLRA, an employer that lays off employees 
because of a lack of work may impose a commensurate reduction in 
their salaries. Although not specifically encompassed by our 
decisions such as City of New Rochelle, supra, and Schuylerville 
CSD, supra, the reasoning of those decisions applies to layoffs 
because of lack of work to the same extent that it does to layoffs 
because of a curtailment of services. We, therefore, determine 
2/ that the charge before us is without merit.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE REVERSE the hearing officer, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: January 12, 1982 
Albany, New York 
/Harold R. Newman. ' , Chairman 
David C." Randies , Memh/e'r 
2/ 
— It is unnecessary for us to reach the question whether a public 
employer is required to give notice to an employee organization 
of its intent to layoff employees without pay so that the 
employee organization may seek negotiations to ameliorate the 
impact of the layoffs. The Association has not alleged 
insufficient notice in the case before us and indeed has 
acknowledged that it has not been denied an opportunity to 
negotiate the impact. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF MINEOLA, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LOUIS LENO, 
•PATRICK Me MURPHY, JR., ESQ,, for 
Respondent 
O'DWYER & BERNSTEIN, ESQS. (JOSEPH LICATA, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Village of 
Mineola to a hearing officer's decision that it discriminatorily 
discharged Louis Leno, The Village had claimed that it dis-
charged Leno for bona fide business reasons but the hearing 
officer found that the reasons given by the Village for Leno's 
discharge were not supported by the record. He concluded that 
the Village would not have fired Leno but for his efforts to 
organize the Village's employees on behalf of the Teamsters. 
In support of its exceptions, the Village argues that the 
facts found by the hearing officer are not supported by the 
record. Having reviewed the evidence, we determine that it 
supports the hearing officer's findings of fact and that it 
establishes a flagrant violation of the Act. 
#2D-l/l2/82 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4621 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing officer, 
and 
WE, ORDER the Village of Mineola to: 
1. Offer Leno reinstatementto his former 
position; 
2. Compensate Leno for any loss of pay and. 
benefl~ts"'"sui:f'e^  "'"" 
termination from the date thereof to the 
date of the offer, of reins tat emerit less .'aiiy 
earnings derived from other employment, 
with interest at the annual rate of 
three percent. 
3. Cease and desist from interfering with, 
restraining, coercing or discriminating 
against its employees for the exercise 
of rights protected by the Act; 
4. Conspicuously post a notice in the form 
attached at all locations throughout the 
Village ordinarily used to communicate 
information to unit employees. 
DATED: January 11, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C.Randies, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
^UBUCLEMaiaaOJaLBEL^QQySuBQABCL 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees tha t : 
(1) The Incorporated Village of Mineola will offer Louis Leno 
reinstatement to his former position. 
(2) The Incorporated Village of Mineola will make Louis Leno 
whole for any loss of pay and benefits suffered by reason 
of his termination from the date thereof to the date of the 
offer of reinstatement less any earnings derived from other 
employment, with interest at the annual rate of three 
percent. 
(3) The Incorporated Village of Mineola will not interfere with, 
restrain, coerce or discriminate against its employees 
for the exercise of rights protected by the Act. 
I n c o r p o r a t e d V i l l a g e of .Mineola, 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. , v ^^r^n 
m 7280 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRENTWOOD CLERICAL ASSOCIATION 
#2E-l/12/82 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
upbir^the1 Charge"of—Violat ion':'- cif--Seet ion--~--- ;::"•----'::-"->m^-^^3—^^^^-
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. CASii NO. D-0196" 
On September 8, 1980, Counsel to the Public Employment 
Relations Board (Counsel) filed a charge alleging that the 
Brentwood Clerical Association (Association) caused, instigated, 
encouraged, condoned and engaged in a strike against the 
Brentwood Union Free School District (District) on May 23, 27, 
28 and June 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9, 1980. The hearing officer 
determined that employees of the District engaged in a strike 
against it on the eight days specified in the charge, but 
that the evidence did not establish any responsibility of the 
Association for that strike.— Counsel has filed no exception 
to this determination.- On the contrary, he acknowledges that 
the evidence is not sufficient to sustain.a finding•implicating 
the Association in the strike. 
1 The hearing officer's decision also dismissed an improper 
practice charge filed by the Association against the 
District (Case No. U-4752). No exceptions were taken to 
that part of the consolidated decision and it is, therefore, 
not before us . 
II 7281 
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Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer 
.and WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
January 11, 1982 
- ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/C^aut-ca.^ 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
. R a n d i e s VMember 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLE COUNTRY TEACHERS.ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-aiid-
#2F-l/12/82 
JOSEPH WERNER, 
^BOA:RB^^EC^ES:ION^AN:D^ 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-5145 
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (NANCY E. 
HOFFMAN, ESQ. of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
STUART A. ROSENFELDT,, ESQ.,' for "Charging 
Party 
This matter ..comes to us on the exceptions of Middle Country 
Teachers Association (MCTA) to a hearing officer's decision which [ 
I 
sustained an., improper practice charge filed by Joseph Werner j 
(Werner) on January 2, 1981. The hearing officer found that MCTA j 
had failed to provide adequate financial information to Werner 
< 
with the refund check given to Werner applicable to that portion j 
i 
of his agency fee deductions submitted to its affiliates,New 
York State United Teachers (NYSUT) and American Federation of j 
Teachers (AFT), for 1978-79. The hearing officer determined \ 
that such failure constituted a violation of §209'-a.2(a) of the j 
i 
Act. 
Pursuant- to MCTA's agency fee refund procedure, Werner | 
requested a refund of agency fee deductions for the year 1978-7* 
b 72? 
i 
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In October 1979, Werner received a check for $2.37 from MCTA i 
I 
representing its agency fee refund. The instant charge does not j 
allege any impropriety in MCTA's refund or with regard to any j 
information it may have provided to Werner regarding its j 
1 
expenditures. Werner thereafter received, on September 2, 1980, j 
a check for $1.80 representing the agency fee refund for that i 
portion of the monies which MCTA forwarded to NYSUT and AFT. No [ 
financial information accompanied this check. Werner returned 
the check and requested a financial ..breakdown;, . MCTA r.esponded;. 
that':.;it .:did no £. have such information but; would,, forward Werner's j 
i 
request., to- :NYSUT,.. .which -it :.did.... 'Werner, received ho. information • 
I 
relating t'oV.NYSUT.'Or', AFT expenditures: prior'.to .filing his charge, j 
1/ 
Relying on prior decisions of this Board, the hearing officer 
i 
concluded that MCTA has the obligation to provide necessary | 
financial information relating to its affiliates at the time of j 
• i 
the refund attributable to the affiliates and that failure to do | 
i 
so constituted a violation of the Act. The hearing officer also j 
i 
concluded that certain financial information furnished to Werner j 
in May 1981, apparently as a result of another charge filed by j 
Werner, was not adequate. 
! 
As a remedy for the violation found, the hearing officer I 
| 
directed MCTA: (1) to refund to Werner the amount forwarded i 
I 
from his agency fee deductions for 1978-79 to NYSUT and AFT, with \ 
3/UUP (Barry), 13 PERB 1(3090; Hampton Bays, 14 PERB 1(3018; and 
East Moriches, 14 PERB 1(3056. 
7284 | 
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! 
r, 
interest at 6% per annum; (2) to amend its refund procedure j 
1 
within 3 0 days to establish a method for furnishing financial | 
information regarding expenditures of its affiliates, and if MCTA | 
5 
fails to do so, its right to collect agency fee deductions is 
suspended; (3) at the time of any future refund, to furnish an | 
itemized; ^^udi^d^stsfeemeri^©^ 
expenditures of its affiliates, which receive either directly or 
indirectly, any portion of their revenue from agency fees or 
I 
dues, together with the basis of the determination of the amount 
! 
of refund, including identification of those items of expense j 
! 
determined to be refundable or nonrefundable; and (4) to 
post appropriate notices. ] 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, MCTA argues that: 
(1) The charge is premature because Werner failed to 
exhaust the organization's internal refund 
procedure; 
(2) MCTA did not violate the Act since the Act does 
not require the furnishing 'of financial information 
at the time of refund, and in any event, MCTA made 
a reasonable effort to obtain such information; 
(3) The hearing officer should not have considered the | 
adequacy of the financial information furnished to j 
Werner since it was furnished in connection with \ 
( 
another charge, but, in any event, such information I 
was adequate under the Board's decision in East f 
i 
M o r i c h e s ; _ i 
— t 7285 j 
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i 
(4) The hearing officer's direction to refund all 
i 
I 
of the deductions transmitted to the affiliates", and] 
the direction to amend the procedures, subject to ! 
suspension of the right to agency fee deductions, : 
s 
are inappropriate and punitive; the acts complained j 
of took place prior to the Board's decisions relied j 
on by the hearing officer and there is no evidence 
I in the record of MCTA's bad faith; furthermore, j 
the charge did not challenge the adequacy of the 
procedures; 
(5) Assuming that Werner is entitled to financial 
information, the only appropriate remedy in this 
case is a direction to MCTA to provide such 
information. 
Werner's response to the exceptions asserts that the charge 
is not premature; that this Board's decision in UUP (Barry) 
disposes of all substantive issues in this case; and that the 
only issue is the propriety of the remedy directed by the 
hearing officer, which Werner believes to be reasonable and 
appropriate. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the hearing officer's determination that the j 
I 
failure of M C T A to provide adequate financial information as to j 
the basis of its affiliates' refund at the time that refund was i 
I 
r, 
made constitutes a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. UUP (Barry)! 
1 
13 PERB 1(3090: Hampton Bays, 14 PERB 1(3018; East. Moriches, j 
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i 
i 
14 PERB 1(3 056 and West bury, 14 PERB <|[306 3. We conclude that 
MCTA's exceptions to that substantive determination raise issues j 
I identical to those dealt with and determined by us in our prior 
decisions. For the reasons set forth in those decisions we find j 
the exceptions in this case to be without merit. j 
~; ^=-;^e~coneiud:e:7--however-/;:^ 
exceptions to the remedial order proposed by the hearing officer, j 
I n
 Westbury, we recognized that an order directing the refund of 
the agency fee deductions of the charging party and suspension j 
of the right to collect agency fees would be - in principle - an 
! 
appropriate remedy for failure to provide adequate financial 
information since such a remedy is reasonably designed to prompt 
an employee organization to meet its obligations under the Act.. 
In that case, however, we declined to order an immediate refund 
and suspension where the record revealed that the failure to 
furnish the information occurred prior to clarification of the 
organization's obligation by this Board. Since the same circum-
stance is present in this case, we consider it appropriate to 
adopt a remedial order similar to' that adopted in Westbury. 
Amendment of MCTA's refund procedures is not necessary since our 
order will directly impose on the organization the requirement for 
financial disclosure. 
i 
NOW, THEREFORE^ we determine that Middle Country Teachers { 
1 
Association has violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act and j 
WE ORDER THAT j 
i 
(1) The Middle Country Teachers Association shall 
furnish to Joseph Werner, within 3 0 days of the 
i 
date of this order, an itemized, audited statement | 
f? 7287 I 
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of receipts and disbursements for 197 8-7 9 of any 
j 
of its affiliates receiving any portion of their 
revenues from the Middle Country Teachers 
Association agency fees or dues, such statement to 
indicate_ the: bji^ _ 
amount of refund, including identification 
of those disbursements of its affiliates that are 
refundable and those that are not. Should it fail 
to do so, Middle Country Teachers; Association 
shall cease and desist from collecting any agency 
shop fees from Joseph Werner until such time as it 
furnishes, him with such statement and shall refund j 
I to Joseph Werner the amount forwarded from his 
agency fee deduction for 197 8-7 9 to IJYSUT and AFT 
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. s 
\ 
I (2) At the time of making,any other and future refunds t 
' I 
to agency fee payers, the Middle Country Teachers ! 
Association shall furnish to such persons, together 
with those refunds, an itemized, audited statement 
of its receipts and disbursements and those of any 
of its affiliates receiving any portion of their 
revenues from agency fees or dues, such statement to 
indicate the basis of the determination of the amount 
1 
> 
of refund, including identification of those disburse^-
ments of the Association and its affiliates that j 
i 
i 
are refundable and those that are not. j 
. 7288 | 
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(3) The Middle Country Teachers Association shall post 
a notice in the form attached on all bulletin boards 
regularly used by the Association to communicate 
with unit • employees. 
BATED1:;::;v Axbahyy"'^ -ew^ Tox'K" 
January 11, 1982 
:
^^crCJP/f^ >*L, 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<§*£c A^^a^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPL 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all unit employees that: 
We will, at the time of making all future refunds to 
agency fee payers, furnish to such persons, together 
with those refunds, an itemized, audited statement of 
the Association's receipts and disbursements and those 
of its affiliates receiving any portion of their revenues 
from agency fees or dues, such statement to indicate 
the basis of the determination of the amount of refund, 
including identification of those disbursements of the 
Association and its affiliates that are refundable and 
those that are not. 
MIDDLE COUNTRY TEACHERS. ASSOCIATION. 
Employee Organization 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ^ O O f l 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BEACON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
- and - Employer, 
PERB 58.3 
BEACON ASSOCIATION OF OFFICE PERSONNEL, 
NYEA/NEA, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
CITY OF BEACON SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT, 
DUTCHESS COUNTY EDUCATIONAL CHAPTER, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
#3A-l/l2/82 
Case No. C-2326 
— — — — ^ A — reprllTsehtati^lr^r =' 
above matter by the Pxiblic Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the" Beacon Association of Office 
Personnel, NYEA/NEA • . 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. . • 
Unit: Included: all full-time positions and ten (10) month 
and eleven (11) month positions of the 
clerical staff of the City of Beacon School 
District' 
Excluded: confidential secretary -to the Superintendent 
of Schools and District Clerk, 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Beacon Association of Office 
Personnel, NYEA/NEA -
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 11th day of January , 198?.. 
' Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
C&^lZ-' -C^sLt^fl^-
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
# 3 B - l / 1 2 / 8 2 
Case No. C-2324 
In the Matter of 
KESHEQUA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED TEACHERS OF KESHEQUA, NYEA/NEA, 
Petitioner, 
- and-
KESHEQUA CENTRAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT/AFT, • intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
-A--representatiori--pr6ce^ d:i-ng--havS 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations' Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been s.elected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, ' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
United Teachers of Keshequa, NYEA/NEA . . 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the empldyees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of " 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All.professional, certificated personnel 
Excluded: Chief Executive Officer, Elementary Principal, 
Secondary Principals and Guidance Director 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that .the above named public employer 
shall .negotiate collectively with • 
United Teachers of Keshequa, NYEA/NEA 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee .organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 12th day of January 
Albany, New York 
198: 
Harold R Newman, Chairman 
jd^Cu^e^ 
Ida Klaas, Member 
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